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1. Introduction * There is ample evidence that large corporations operate an internal capital market, r tributing capital between their divisions (e.g., Lamont, 1997, and Shin and Stulz, 1998) . B theoretical and the empirical literature focus mainly on the question of whether the operati internal capital market improves the allocation of capital over existing investment oppor
In contrast, this article explores the implications of an internal capital market for the of new investment opportunities by self-interested (division) managers. We show that t potentially a tradeoff between allocative efficiency and incentive provision.
Our main presumption is that when corporate headquarters has control over mult visions, it cannot commit ex ante how to allocate capital. Headquarters will engage in picking," putting scarce resources to their most profitable use. We find that beside incr allocative efficiency, operating an internal capital market has a profound impact on divisi agers' incentives to create profitable investment opportunities.
If divisions are ex ante homogeneous, i.e., if they generate the same amount of r have the same potential to generate new investment opportunities, winner picking un improves incentives for all division managers. There are two positive effects. First, internal capital market allows the excess funds of one division to be drawn on to investment in other, more-constrained, divisions. This provides additional rewards, prefer to run larger businesses. Second, reallocation of resources need not be confin funds. As further resources are transferred away from underperforming divisions incentives are created by both punishing these divisions and rewarding outperformi If divisions differ in resources or investment potential, the operation of an inte market may, however, reduce incentives for some divisions, creating a tradeoff bet allocative efficiency over a given set of investment opportunities and the provision to create profitable opportunities in the first place. The reason is a third effect, which i when divisions are homogeneous. If divisions differ in their financial resources or their potential, a reallocation of funds from one division to another may take place even if a worked hard and succeeded in creating new profitable investment opportunities. In can be optimal to separately incorporate some divisions (e.g., via a spinoff) in order the sensitivity of capital allocation to the profitability of their own investment opport is consistent with the finding in Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (2002) that, followin investment becomes significantly more sensitive to measures of investment opportu
We further shed light on the question of which businesses should ultimately be i jointly or separately. We distinguish between more-and less-mature businesses. In a business, managers must have incentives to increase the profitability of a narrow set of ties, e.g., by finding ways to streamline production processes. In a less mature busine can create value by opening up new markets or developing new products. Our analy that separate incorporation (e.g., via a spinoff) may be necessary to adequately motiv of less-mature businesses.' In contrast, the competition created by an internal capital be vital to create incentives for managers of more-mature businesses. We further show contrast to the case of separate incorporation, tighter financial constraints may inc managers' incentives in an internal capital market, though this is more likely to be more-mature businesses. We also discuss the role of capital budgeting mechanisms a precommit to a particular allocation of capital, and we analyze how correlation betw business prospects affects the potential benefits from joint incorporation.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the related literature presents the model. In Sections 4 and 5 we derive our main results, comparing ince separate and joint incorporation. Section 6 contains a discussion and some robustn Section 7 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Related literature * Our assumption that headquarters chooses a profit-maximizing allocation of resou in line with arguments made by Williamson (1975), Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1 Stein (1997) . More recently, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan, Servaes, and (2000) have argued that conglomerates may invest inefficiently in underperforming div evidence on whether internal capital markets allocate resources efficiently or not is mi Servaes, and Zingales provide evidence of "corporate socialism," while Khanna and Ti and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) document cases where internal capital markets (r resources efficiently.2
1 The extant literature on spinoffs has focused on advantages stemming from a better alignment with sha interests and a (re)orientation toward core competencies (e.g., Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar, 1997, an Narayanan, 1999) .
2 Billett and Mauer (2000, 2003) provide evidence for both more-and less-efficient allocation in inte markets. ? RAND 2005. may suffer from sample-selection biases (e.g., Campa and Kedia, 2002, and and Wolf, 2002) or measurement errors (e.g., Whited, 2001 ). In our model, th of different businesses can add or destroy value, even though capital is allocate Servaes, and Zingales (2000) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) also find that is less likely to create value if divisions are highly different. They argue th inefficiently tilt the allocation of resources in favor of less-profitable divis sequent internal conflicts. Focusing on the creation of investment opportun joint incorporation of different divisions can destroy value through its potenti incentives even though capital is allocated efficiently. Matsusaka and Nanda (2002) and Inderst and MUller (2003) Finally, the assumption that headquarters cannot precommit to a (stateallocation resembles the difficulty of relinquishing formal authority inside Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999) or between owners and management i (1997). Likewise, Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) , Gertner, Scharfstein, and Gautier and Heider (2003) show how headquarters' ability to redeploy asse inside the organization may create a hold-up problem and stifle incentives.
3. The model * Projects and technologies. Consider a set I = {1, 2, ... , n} of projects ( business). Each business is run by a (division) manager, who manages the existing can work on new investment opportunities. The profitability of the investment oppo business i can be either high or low, depending on the project's type ti c T = {g, b "bad"). If an amount K is invested in a project of type ti, it yields a net present val which is characterized by the following assumption. Assumption 1. For all i E I, Yi(K, t) is continuously differentiable in K, wher aYi(K, t)/aK is strictly decreasing in K, strictly positive for K = 0, and strictly ne sufficiently high K. Moreover, yi(K, g) > 0 implies yi(K, g) > yi(K, b).
By Assumption 1, the marginal net present value for a good project, yi(K, g), is h that for a bad project, yi(K, b). We define the unique investment level that maximi
The profitability of investment opportunities depends on the effort e e {E, h "high") that is exerted by the respective manager. If manager i exerts high effort, will be of the good type with probability ph. Following low effort, the respective pr p, where 0 < pe < ph < 1 for all i C I. Exerting high effort comes at the priva ci > 0, while low effort is costless. The chosen effort level is not observable to oth Managers also derive private benefits aKi with a > 0 from controlling the investm their supervision. Heading larger divisions may be more prestigious, or it may enhan human capital and thus increase their future wage.3 All parties are risk neutral. We the risk-free rate of return to zero. Hence, if manager i receives a wage w and if h allocated capital K, his utility is w + aK or w + a K -ci, depending on whether he c high effort. Managers have no personal funds and a reservation value of zero.
O Financial resources and capital allocation. Each project i has an initial end financial resources Xi. (This could comprise cash, financial assets, and funds from c borrowing.) We distinguish between two cases. In the first case, headquarters can o to a given project the resources generated by this project. This situation is akin to projects are incorporated separately. In the second case, projects are jointly incor headquarters operates an internal capital market, i.e., headquarters can draw on the all divisions when it decides how to optimally allocate capital.
Headquarters can observe the profitability of investment opportunities and a available funds so as to maximize total firm value. We assume that divisions uncorrelated. Funds that are not invested in divisions' real assets can be invested in financial assets, which yields the risk-free rate of return. Importantly, headquarters cannot commit to some (state-contingent) allocation of capital. This may be the case because the profitability of projects is hard to verify by outsiders-let alone courts. Also, if projects are operated under a single roof, it may be hard or even impossible for headquarters to tie its hands and commit not to reallocate funds even without the consent of division managers, e.g., by adjusting transfer prices or the allocation of overhead costs.
Two assumptions deserve further comment. First, we assume that the financial resources Xi are the only funds available for investment, implying that a reallocation of funds is possible only within a firm. Stein (1997) provides a formalization of the idea that an internal capital market eases financing constraints as headquarters has an (informational) advantage in picking the most profitable investment opportunities. As we show later, in our model owners may even prefer to constrain the amount of financial resources to boost managers' incentives. The second assumption that deserves comment is that headquarters acts in the interest of owners when allocating funds. While headquarters may well be reluctant to return funds to investors, it may not want to waste funds by pouring them into relatively unprofitable investments. Putting it succinctly, while headquarters may engage in empire building, it wants to build the most valuable empire.
a Timeline of the model. We summarize the working of the model by stating the timing of all events. If feasible, headquarters can first offer to pay managers a contingent wage that rewards them for good performance. Subsequently, managers choose their respective effort levels ei, and projects' types ti are realized. Based on headquarters' observations of ti, it chooses the optimal investment levels Ki. Finally, payoffs are realized and the game ends.
In the case of separate incorporation, the allocation of capital to division i is constrained by the requirement Ki < Xi. In the case of joint incorporation, an aggregate resource constraint applies: EiEI Ki < EiEI Xi 4. Analysis: capital allocation and incentives * Separate incorporation. If project i is incorporated separately, the optimal allocation of capital is given by KS(ti) = min{K*((ti), Xi}. For Xi < K'(ti) the firm is financially constrained and not all profitable investment opportunities can be realized. By Assumption 1, good projects have more investment potential. Consequently, the difference Vis := KS(g) -K(b) (1) is strictly positive unless capital is sufficiently scarce, in Xi. We call ViS the investment sensitivity. Lemma 1 foll If capital is not extremely scarce or abundant, i.e., if K (b) < Xi < K'(g), t sensitivity is strictly increasing in Xi. The investment sensitivity plays a key incentives for division managers. Suppose first that incentive pay is not feasib contractible. Incentives are then provided exclusively by the allocation of capita will choose high effort only if (h -pe)aVi > Ci, (2) i.e., if the investment sensitivity is suffic plays a crucial role in providing incentives. value, he will be paid zero for generating optimal for the firm to pay a wage of zero sufficient incentives. (Given our assumption is surely satisfied.) But if (2) does not hold strictly positive wage in the good state, w to satisfy the manager's incentive constra wS (g) = h . e-(xVi h _ The higher the investment sensitivity Vis in (3), the lower the performance wage that is to elicit high effort. That incentives arising from capital allocation can substitute for in is confirmed by Wulf (2002) , who finds evidence that a lower responsiveness of capit to a division's own profits goes along with more performance pay.
o Joint incorporation and the operation of an internal capital market. Under j poration, headquarters can operate an internal capital market. This has two major im First, headquarters can now tap into the resources of all projects. Second, headquar pick from all investment opportunities to channel funds to their most profitable convenient to restrict consideration to only two projects, I = {1,2}, though insights can be generalized to arbitrary sets I. Denote the amount of capital that is allocated to project i by Ki(ti, tj). Headquarters chooses Ki(ti, tj) to maximize th present value, Y1(Kl(tl, t2), tl) + Y2(K2(t2, tl), t2), subject to the aggregate resourc Kl(tl, t2) + K2(t2, tl) < X1 + X2. Lemma 2 follows immediately from Assumption 1 Lemma 2. Under joint incorporation, the optimal capital allocation, Ki(ti, tj), determined. If the capital constraint does not bind as X +X2 > Kj (g)+K K(b), we have K (ti). Otherwise, either Ki(ti, tj) is uniquely determined by yl(Kl(tl, t2), tl) = y2(K2( and the binding resource constraint, or else a comer solution exists and one division funds.
The amount of capital that is allocated to a particular project depends now on the profitability of both projects.4 We denote by Et [KJ(ti, tj)] the expected investment in project i when it has type ti. The resulting (expected) investment sensitivity is then given by
Consequently, without monetary incentives, manager i now exerts high effort only if (pi -p)aVij > ci. (5) If incentive pay is feasible, it is again optimal with low profitability. When (5) does not hold, the "gap" in incentives is made up b positive wage wJ(g) for managers of high-type projects, where optimally5 w (g)= -h ie Vi (6) Hence, the higher the investment sensitivity Vi, the lower firm's expected wage bill.
In what follows, we compare managers' incentives und comparing the respective investment sensitivities ViS and the difference in sensitivities ViJ -Vis and thus the mo managers' effort choice. If performance pay is feasible additional incentives, choosing the mode of incorporation minimizes the total wage bill. We have thus arrived at the following proposition. Proposition 1. Suppose both projects have the same amount of resources and the technologies, i.e., Xi = X and yi(K, t) = y(K, t) for both i E I and all t E T.
(i) If capital is constrained because X < K*(g), we obtain ViJ > ViS.
incorporation increases the investment sensitivity and thereby incentive (ii) If capital is never constrained, we obtain ViJ = ViS, i.e., incentives do the mode of incorporation.
Symmetry in resources and investment technologies leads to clear-cut result of an internal capital market increases investment sensitivity by increasing ca the outperforming division and, if capital is sufficiently scarce, by reducing ca the underperforming division. If projects differ in either their resources or their may no longer be the case.
o Heterogeneous projects. Suppose first that projects differ only in resources y(K, t) holds for both i E I and all t E T, while X1 > X2. Take first the " i = 2, which has fewer financial resources than division i = 1. In case X2 > never scarce and joint incorporation consequently has no impact on capital alloca scarce, however, joint integration again allows a better reward to division i = 2 f a type-g project. In fact, given that X1 > X2 and that divisions have homogen potential, capital will now always be reallocated to division i = 2 if the projec i.e., regardless of the type of division i = 1. (Of course, unless X1 is sufficien allocation is higher if division i = 1 has less-profitable investment opportunitie Consider next the "rich" division i = 1. If X1 is very large, this division wi provider of excess funds, but its own investment level will not be affected. In con relatively scarce, joint incorporation may drain resources even if the division ha opportunities. This reallocation decreases incentives. At the same time, however be diverted if tl = b, which in turn increases incentives. While the overall ef ambiguous, we can show that as the difference in endowments X1 -X2 increases that joint incorporation reduces incentives for i = 1. Proposition 2. Suppose that projects have the same investment technology, i.e., for both i E I and all t E T, while A := X1 -X2 > 0. Capital allocation is not af mode of incorporation if X2 > K*(g). Otherwise, incentives for i = 2 are stric joint incorporation and V2J -V is increasing in A, holding X1 + X2 constant. In may either increase or decrease under joint incorporation, while VJ -Vs is dec Below we will choose a particular functional form for the investment technolo when it is more likely that incentives for the "rich" division decrease under join If divisions have the same level of financial resources but differ in th technologies, it is also no longer guaranteed that competition in an internal capi incentives for all division managers. Again, it depends on how joint incorpor allocation in the good state relative to that in the bad state. In this case, exam those provided below) show that the results are very sensitive to the specific fu investment opportunities.
o Incentive provision versus allocative efficiency. As this is the novelty the analysis focuses on how joint incorporation affects division managers' inc new investment opportunities. Another aspect of an internal capital market is improvement of allocative efficiency. With heterogeneous projects, this may between achieving the right incentives for all divisions and greater (ex post) allo One particular case where the incentive effect can dominate the allocation effect i pay is not feasible. In this case, operating different businesses under one roof sufficient incentives for all division managers and thus may stifle the creation of opportunities.
E Investment sensitivity and capital constraints. We next analyze how changes in the total amount of financial resources affect investment sensitivity and thereby managers' incentives. For instance, one way in which total resources can be increased is by including a "cash cow" project, i.e., a project that generates cash from assets in place but is itself no longer a competitor for fresh capital injections. We find that integrating a cash cow may dampen incentives if the firm previously operated an active internal capital market.
Consider first separate incorporation. Here, a marginal increase in Xi has no effect on incentives if capital is very scarce or if it is abundant. While it does not affect capital allocation at all in the latter case, where Xi > K*(g), it increases capital allocation by the same amount in both states if Xi < K*(b), which leaves Vis unaffected. In contrast, in the intermediate case, where K (b) < Xi < K*(g), an increase in Xi strictly increases Vis. In total, if we increase financial resources under separate incorporation, incentives will never decrease. This is no longer the case under joint incorporation. Under joint incorporation, managers again have no incentives if capital is abundant. But if capital is scarce, i.e., if Xo = X1 + X2 falls short of Kj(g) + K*(g) = 2, operating an internal capital market leads to strictly positive incentives: ViJ > 0. In an internal capital market wher funds are not abundant, the investment criterion is no longer whether the incremental NPV from additional investment is positive. Instead, competition establishes a performance benchmark tha is strictly above the zero-NPV rule. Consequently, it now pays for division managers to exer effort so as to increase the marginal NPV and thereby receive a larger fraction of total investment
We have thus arrived at the following result. We next analyze how incentives under joint incorporation are affected by a change in tot financial resources. We again assume that projects have homogeneous investment technologies, i.e., that fil = i2 = fl. With the specified investment technology, Xo < 2K*(b) holds whenever capital is scarce. By Proposition 4, condition (8) then determines how a relaxation of financia constraints affects incentives. We distinguish between two cases. If 1 -1/ft < Xo < capital is not too scarce and we obtain from (9) 
. By fB > 1 we thus have thatdK(b, g)/dXo strictly exceeds dK(g, b)/dXo such that (8) holds. Hence, for intermediate levels of financial resources, a larger fraction of additional capital goes into the type-b project and incentives are consequently mute However, if capital is very scarce, X < 1 -1l/i, all capital goes into the type-g project, and a marginal increase in Xo thus increases incentives. We summarize results as follows.
Proposition 6. If both projects are in more-mature businesses (as defined above) and have the same investment technology, a marginal increase of financial resources under joint incorporatio increases incentives if capital is sufficiently scarce, i.e., if Xo < 1 -1/f. If capital is less scarce (but also not abundant), i.e., if 1 -1/p < XO < 2, relaxing the capital constraint reduce incentives.
D Joint incorporation of less-mature businesses. Suppose now that project i is in a less mature business such that yi(K, b) = 1 -K and yi(K, g) = 1 -yiK. Since K' (b) = 1 and K (g) = 1/yi, we now have that Ki(b) = max{Xi, } and Ki(g) = max{Xi, 1/yi . Hence, unles Xi < 1, incentives from capital allocation are now always strictly positive. This is intuitive, a creating a type-g project enlarges the set of positive-NPV projects and increases investment.
In contrast to the case with more-mature businesses, creating or intensifying com in an internal capital market is now no longer unambiguously beneficial for incenti result that brings this out most clearly is that, in stark contrast to the case with mo businesses, relaxing the capital constraint in an internal capital market will now alway incentives for both divisions. (This is proven formally in Proposition 7.) In addition, i are heterogeneous, it is now easy to find examples such that joint incorporation reduces for at least one division.
To see this, suppose first that projects differ only in their financial resources s Yi = Y2 = y and X1 > X2. We ignore from now on the trivial case X2 > K*(g), where never scarce. From Proposition 2 we know that the "poor" division's incentives are alwa under joint incorporation. In case K*(g) + K*(b) < Xo < 2K*(g), which becomes 1 + 1/y < Xo < 2/y, (10) the allocation to i = 1 is the same as under separat g, in which case it is strictly lower. Consequently of total financial resources, joint incorporation st Suppose next that X1 = X2 = X and that i = 1 Yl < Y2. It is immediate to see that joint incorpora can stifle incentives for i = 2, we take again the c In analogy to condition (10), suppose that 1 + l/yi < Xo < l/yl + l/2. (11) If (11) o Contracting on capital allocation. A key feature so far is that headquarters cannot ex ante how to allocate capital. Instead, after the projects' types have been revealed, he allocates capital so as to maximize profits. From an ex ante perspective, however, this optimal due to the way capital allocation affects incentives. To highlight the potential committing to a particular capital allocation, we examine the case in which capital cons From Assumption 1, Proposition 9 immediately implies that Ki(g) > K (g) and Ki(b) < K[(b). Thus, if commitment is feasible, headquarters optimally increases the investment sensitivity and thereby creates additional incentives. For a type-g project this implies a strictly higher capital allocation up to the point where the marginal net present value equals -a. This is intuitive because a is just the marginal reduction in the performance wage that is feasible following a marginal increase of capital in the good state. Likewise, it is optimal to reduce capital allocated to a type-b project up to the point where the loss in marginal returns is just equal to the afforded marginal reduction in the wage bill.
If the firm has excess funds, investing less than the amount that is ex post optimal for headquarters is not renegotiation proof. Expost, both headquarters and the manager would prefer a higher investment level. In this case, another interesting advantage of operating an internal capital market arises. If funds are already promised to another division, any changes in investment levels require the consent of both managers. We can show that joint integration can make additional punishment of the type-b project feasible if this is not the case under separate incorporation.8 o Multiple periods. In this article, self-interested managers care about the profitability of their projects because higher profitability leads to higher capital allocation, for which managers have a strict preference. If we extended our model to multiple periods, managers could also derive incentives from the fact that the subsequently generated cash flow is needed to (re)finance investments. However, in an internal capital market this additional source of incentives may be relatively weak due to a public-good problem: cash flow is first confiscated by headquarters before being redistributed to divisions.
This free-riding effect in generating cash is at the heart of Brusco and Panunzi (forthcoming).
Focusing only on this effect, they show that joint integration always stifles incentives. A potentially interesting combination of their work and ours could consider a multitask framework in which managers can work on various projects. We would conjecture that under joint incorporation, managers become biased in favor of creating new investment opportunities and consequently neglect to create current cash flow. Since everybody hopes to have a free ride on the cash flow generated by other divisions, the company may in the end be left short of funds, which may in turn stifle the creation of opportunities. Ultimately, the integrated firm might get the worst of both worlds: little cash for investments and few profitable investment opportunities.
7. Conclusion * We have analyzed how an internal capital market can affect managers' incentives t profitable investment opportunities. Our analysis suggests that firm value increases if becomes more sensitive to projects' (or divisions') profitability because this increases incentives to generate profitable investment opportunities.
Studying different modes of incorporation, we show that operating an interna market can both increase and decrease the investment sensitivity of an individual bu Consequently, a lower investment sensitivity under joint integration does not prov evidence of an inefficient allocation of capital. Moreover, operating an internal capital m not unambiguously create value even if capital is allocated efficiently. We find that comp 7 The other cases lead to similar qualitative implications on how capital allocation is optimally disto commitment.
scarce financial resources unambiguously increases incentives only if projects are h If projects are heterogeneous, i.e., if they have different financial resources or gro joint incorporation may stifle incentives for some divisions.
We also find that making capital more scarce can create additional incentives i capital market. This result is markedly different from the case of separate incorpo more capital always (weakly) increases investment sensitivity and thereby incentiv
With linear investment technologies, we find that if managerial effort is primarily enhance the profit potential of a fixed set of investment opportunities, an internal ca is vital for creating incentives. In contrast, an internal capital market can reduce managers of less-mature businesses, who must be motivated to create new growth Appendix * Proofs of Propositions 2, 4, 7, 8, and 9 follow.
Proof of Proposition 2. Take first the case of i = 2. From Lemma 1 we have that V2 (weakly) increases in X2, while V2J does not change as Xo = X1 + X2 is held constant. Hence, V2J -V is (weakly) increasing in A.
Take next i = 1, for which we first analyze when joint integration increases and when it decreases incentives.
We have to distinguish several cases. In case (i) we have that X1 < K*(b) such that Vs = 0 and V = ph[Xo/2 -
, and thus V1s = X1 -K*(b). We discuss three subcases of (ii). First, we have that Proof of Proposition 7. It remains to show that an increase in Xo always increases ViJ for i = 1, 2. This follows from (4) after substituting all values K*(ti, tj), which we derive next from (9). We have to distinguish between several cases. In case (i) we have that Xo > 1/yi + l/y2 such that Ki(ti, tj) = K*(ti) for all states. In case (ii) we have that 1 + 1/yi < Xo < l/yi + l/y2 and thus Ki(g, g) = [Yj/(Yi + yj)]Xo and Ki(ti, tj) = K*(ti) for all other states. In case (iii) we have that 1 + l/y2 < Xo < 1 + 1/yl and thus Ki 
